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Investmentin production outside the United States is a method by which U.S. finns raise
their shares in foreign markets and defend them against foreign rivals from the host countries and
from other countries. The investing firms are exploiting their firm-specific assets such as
proprietary technologies, patents, or skills in advertising or marketing, and the opportunity to
produce abroad raises the value of these assets and encourages firms' investment in them by
extending the range of markets and the length of time over which they can be exploited.
Overseas production has contributed to the ability of American multinationals to retain
world market shares in the face of the long-term decline in the share of the U.S. as a country and
short-term changes such as exchange rate fluctuations. It has performed the same functions for
Swedish firms and, more recently, for Japanese firms.
Within U.S. multinationals, those with higher shares of their production overseas have
higher employment at home relative to home production. Foreign production appears to require
larger numbers of employees in headquarters activities such as R&D and supervision.
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Outward Direct Investment and the U.S. Economy
Robert E. Lipsey
Any judgjeent about the wisdom of tax changes that raise or lower the
profitability of American firms' foreign operations, must involve some
judgment as to the desirability of increasing or decreasing the extent of
these operations. The purpose of this paper is to review past research on the
effects of U.S. firms' overseas activities on the U.S. economy and to report
some further analysis with more recent data.
The first question to be answered is what we mean by the U.S. economy.
The ambiguity of the term troubles appraisals of many policies. One way of
looking at it is to ask whether the object is to maximize Cross National
Product or Cross Domestic Product. The former is an ownership-based concept
that includes the profits from overseas operations of U.S. firms and other
income earned overseas by U.S. residents, but excludes profits earned in the
United States by foreign residents. The latter is a geographically-based
concept that covers production that takes place in the United States,
regardless of ownership. It thus excludes profits and other income earned
overseas (from overseas production), but includes all income earned in the
U.S. (from production in the U.S.) by both U.S. and foreign residents. One
way in which the distinction surfaces in policy discussions is over whether
various types of assistance or preferences are to be applied to U.S. -
controlledfirms, regardless of where they operate, or to firms producing in
the U.S., whether domestically' or foreign-owned.-2-
I will try to construe the issue broadly. That means I will consider
effects of outward foreign direct investment on the labor employed in the U.S.
by the investing companies and also those on the companies themselves,
including their stockholders, and more generally on the trade and other
aspects of the U.S. economy.
Various studies of the behavior of multinational firms, including some
of my own, view the firms as facing fixed or relatively fixed, worldwide
markets for their products and making decisions mainly about how to supply
that demand most profitably. The firm is pictured as choosing whether to
supply the demand by exporting from the U.S., by producing abroad, or by
licensing technology, patents, or other assets owned by the firm to foreign
licensees who would produce outside the United States.
The assumption of a fixed market for a firm tends to bias conclusions
toward finding that foreign production by U.S. firms substitutes for
production in the United States. An alternative view is that production
abroad is often mainly a way of enlarging a fin's share of foreign markets,
or of preventing or slowing a decline in that share. The inadequacy of the
fixed market assumption is obvious in any attempt to examine the impact of
direct investment in service industries, since the nature of most of these
industries precludes substantial exporting trot one country to another and
market share is almost completely contingent on production at the site of
consumption. While this is most obvious for service industries, it applies
equally to the service component of manufacturing industries, a major part of
the final value of sales of manufactured products.-3-
The Growth of Internationalized Production
The establishment of foreign operations by American firms, and the
establishment by any country's firms of production, including sales and
service activities, outside the home country, is often referred to as the
internationalization of production. In order to understand the process, and
the reasons behind it, it is useful to ask whether it is uniquely or mainly an
Americanphenomenon or is, undersome circumstances common to foreign firms as
well.
The studies of Cleona Lewis (1938) and Mira Wilkins(1989) on foreign
investment in the United States make it clear that direct investment and
internationalized production were not an American invention. When the United
States lagged technologically in many fields, foreign fins found it
profitable to develop marketing and production facilities in the United States
to exploit their superior sophistication. The industrial distributions of
these operations from different countries clearly reflected some specific
technological advantages, such as those of Great Britain in various aspects of
the textile industry and of Germany in chemicals.
What has been unique about the United States is that direct investment
has been the characteristic form of U.S. foreign investment as far back as
data exist, even when the U.S. was still, on balance, importing capital
(Lipsey, 1988). That fact, and the lists of early U.S. investors (Lewis,
1938, Southard, 1931, Wilkins, 1970), concentrated among the leading firms in
various U.S. industries, emphasize the association of direct foreign
investment not with large aggregate supplies of financial or physical capital
but with the possession of firm-specific assets, knowledge and techniques,
sometimes reflected in patents or brand names, that are mobile within firms,-4-
even across national borders, but not among firms.
Not only was direct investment the dominant form of U.S. outward
investment, but the U.S. was the dominant source of the world's direct
investment for a long period. The U.S. share of the world's stock of outward
direct investment was over half around 1970, with the U.K., the next most
important investor, far behind the U.S. at about 15-17 per cent and no other
single country the source of more than 6 per cent. The share of the developed
countries outward direct investment flows originating in the U.S. was well
over half in the l960s and still over 40 per cent in the 1970s. In the late
1980s, however, less than 20 per cent of the world's outward flows originated
in the U.S. and, in a reversal of roles1 the U.S. absorbed over 40 per cent of
the flows from other countries (Lipsey, 1993). In the early l990s, Japan's
role as a source of direct investment flows and the U.S. role as a recipient
both declined sharply. In 1992, the U.S. was again the largest supplier, at
about a quarter of the OECD total, and was not a significant net recipient.
withdrawals and losses equaling or exceeding gross inflows (OECD, 1993, Table I).
The heyday of outward U.S. direct investment outflows, in the 1960s and
at least part of the l910s, involved a considerable internationalization of
U.S. firms' production, in the sense that higher and higher proportions of the
production they controlled took place abroad, larger proportions of their
employees were outside the United States1 and larger shares of their assets
came to be located abroad. Since then, however, the degree of
internationalization of U.S. companies has stabilized or declined, as if the
firms had overshot some desirable level and found it desirable to retreat
somewhat.
The peak in the extent of internationalization in this sense for the.5-
U.S.economyas a whole was reached at some time in the late l9lOs (we cannot
date it more closely because comprehensive data exist only for occasional
foreign investment census years). For example, employment in all overseas
affiliates of U.S. firms was almost 11 per cent of total U.S. non-agricultural
employment in 1977, but only 7 1/2 per cent in 1989. Plant and equipment
expenditures by majority-owned foreign affiliates were over 15 per cent of
domestic U.S. plant and equipment expenditures in U.S. dollars in 1974-76 but
fell below 10 per cent from 1984 to 1988 and have not recovered their earlier
levels. Since the exchange value of the U.S. dollar was low in the late
l980s, the decline in real terms was even larger.
U.S. manufacturing firms have long been much more internationalized than
firms in other industries, with their overseas employment reaching about a
quarter of domestic manufacturing employment in 1977 (from only 10 per cent in
1957) and then declining only slightlyto about 22 per cent in the late 1980s.
Overseas plant and equipment expenditures in manufacturing reached over 20 per
cent of domestic expenditure in dollar terms for a few years in the 1970s. It
fell almost to 10 per cent when the exchange value of the dollar was near its
peak, and then recovered, but so far not to earlier peak levels.
Within those U.S. firms that are multinational, the changes have not
been so sharp, partly because of the importance of manufacturing firms in the
universe of multinationals. However, the time pattern has been similar since
1977 (there is little parent information available before that).
Within manufacturing multinationals, foreign affiliate net sales, a
crude measure of production, were larger in the late l980s relative to parent
sales than in 1977 and affiliate employment was close to the earlier levels
relative to parent employment. Thus, this group of fi±ms has not exhibited-6-
the shift away from internationalized production that has characterizedu.s.
multinationals in general or the U.S. manufacturing sector asa whole. The
affiliate share of production may even have increased (though it istoo
volatile to provide a quick judgment that there is an upwardtrend), and the
affiliate share of employment has not changed much since 1917.
The strongest case for increased internationalization in U.S.
manufacturing is in exports. Affiliates accounted for less than a third of
U.S. multinationals' worldwide exports in 1966, but formore than half in the
second half of the l980s. Their importance relative to totalmanufactured
exports from the U.S. also more than doubled over this period.
The contrast between the changes in internationalizationwithin U.S.
parents and those for the U.S. economy as a whole reflects thedeclining role
of multinational parents within the U.S.economy. Parent employment in the
U.S. fell from 28 per cent of U.S.non-agricultural employment in 1977 to
barely over 20 per cent in the late l98Os, not becauseemployment was moved
overseas, where affiliate employment was also declining, but because these
multinationals were declining in importanceas part of the U.S. economy. This
decline was not simply a reflection of thedecline of manufacturing's share of
U.S. employment, but took place withinmanufacturing as well, where
manufacturing parent firms' share of total domesticmanufacturing employment
fell from over 60 per cent in 1977to a little over 50 per cent in 1988-90.
Thus, the shrinking of many large, establishedU.S. manufacturing firms
affected both their domestic and theirforeign employment. The many anecdotes
about the shifting of domesticemployment abroad do not seem to add up to much
in the aggregate,
especially for the U.S. economy as a whole.
There is one reason why it isas yet difficult to judge whether the-7-
apparent retreat of U.S. firms from foreign operations during the 1980s is a
long term trend. The enormous shift in direct investment toward the United
States by foreign firms, to the point where the U.S. absorbed an unprecedented
share of the rest of the world's outflow of direct investment, suggests that
the United States was an exceptionally attractive location for investment
during this period. If that was the case, it might have been particularly
attractive, relative to locations in other countries, to American firms as
well, as to foreign fins, and that attractiveness would show up as a retreat
from internationalization for U.S. firms while it tended to increase the
degree of internationalization of foreign firms.
One reason for this apparent retreat of American firms from overseas
activity may have been the growth of efficient and aggressive foreign
competitors. The levels of internationalization of the German and Japanese
economies were much lower than that of the United States in the 1970s. Since
then, the internationalization pioneered on a large scale by American firms,
has been copied by European and Japanese firms, and now even by firms from
developing countries.
How widespread is internationalized production in the sense of firms
producing outside their home countries? And is it expanding in the world
economy as a whole? Two opposite influences are at work. Internationali-
zation is most prevalent in manufacturing and least common in services. The
rising powers in manufacturing, such as Japan and some of the developing
countries of Southeast Asia, are increasing the degree to which their
companies carry out their manufacturing outside the home countries. At the
same time, the share of manufacturing in most of the world's economies is
declining, and that of services is increasing. The net result of these two-8-
forces, and of the opposite directions of changes in the U.S. and in other
countries, is that the share of internationalized production in world
output,
after increasing greatly in the twenty years after 195?, perhapstripling, has
grown little since then. The share of Japanese, Cerman, and Swedish firms'
internationalized production has been rising, but that rise has been offsetby
the fall in the much larger U.S. share. Internationalizedproduction by firms
from other countries has almost certainly been rising, but isstarting from
too low a level to have much impact on the total. The share of such
production in worldwide CDP may have been in the range of 10-15per cent in
1990. The U.S. companies accounted for half or more of thistotal, and if the
rise from the recent low point in 1988 continues, the worldwill again be
moving toward a growing importance of internationalized production.
A less equivocal story can be told about the share ofproduction outside
home countries in world trade in manufacturedgoods. That share is clearly
over 10 per cent and seems to have risen even since 1977,mainly because of
the growth of Japanese affiliateexports, but also because U.S. affiliates
have held on to or even increased their sharessince 1977. Thus, world trade
in manufactures, if notnecessarily aggregate world production or employment,
is increasingly made up ofexports from internationalized production.
What can we conclude from these trends in theextent of internationa-
lized production? The practice ofproducing outside the home country is well
entrenched, especially in manufacturing, notonly for U.S. -based companies
but, increasingly, for fins based inother countries. It is increasingly
common for firms in at least the more successful
developing countries, such as
Korea and Taiwan. Presuniably itis an avenue for increasing profitability,
Probably through increasing market shares thatprovide economies of scale in-9-
the exploitation of the firm's assets, such as patents, other technological
assets, reputation, and more generally, skills in production and marketing.
Overseas Production and Exoort Market Shares in Manufacturinc
The share of the United States, as a country, in world export markets
for manufactured goods has been declining over most of the lastquarter
century. In 1990, after some recovery from the low point in 1987 resulting
partly from the earlier period of high exchange values for the dollar, the
share was about 12 per cent, 30 per cent below the share in 1966. U.s.
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LAS defined in BEAinvestmentdata, including
manufactured foods, but excluding petroleum and coal
products.
Source: United Nations trade tapes- 10-
multinationalfirms, exporting from the U.S. and from their overseas
production, held on to their shares much more successfully. gy 1985, when the
U.S. had already lost more than 20 per cent of its share oftwenty years
earlier, U.S. multinationals had increased their share of worldexports.
U.S. Manufacturing Multinationals' Share of







Market Economy. blncluding manufactured foods;excluding petroleum and
coal products
Source: United Nations trade tapes and Lipsey(1993b).
They then lost some of that share in the next twoyears, but ended up in 1990
with a share only 9 per cent below that of 1966.How was this relative
stability of shares achieved? Performance wasvery different for the parent
fins, exporting from the United States, and theaffiliates, exporting from
other countries.
Until at least 1985, the parent firms lost less of theirworld export







1966 11.0 6.6 37.5
1977 9.1 8.3 47.9
1982 9.3 8.1 46.3
1985 9.6 8.7 48.2
1986 8.2 8.4 50.8
1987 7.5 8.2 52.2
1988 7.7 8.3 51.9
1989 8.0 8.4 51.1
1990 7.3 8.7 54.3
For definitions, see previous tables.
Source: United Nations trade tapes and Lipsey (1993b).
sharply, more rapidly than that of other U.S. firms. In the meantime, more
and more of the multinationals' exports were supplied by their overseas
affiliates, more than half since 1986, and at a record high proportion in
1990. Thusoneway the U.S. multinationals kept their export markets, as the
U.S. lost competitiveness in their industries, was by supplying these markets
increasingly from overseas operations, a strategy obviously not available to
non-multinational U.S. firms. (The affiliate shares included in this
calculation are only shares of export trade and exclude the much more
important affiliate sales in their host country markets).
This rise in the importance of exporting from foreign affiliates was not- 12-
uniqueto the United States. Even in Japan, an extremely successful exporter
from home-country production, exports by overseas affiliates rose from 8per
cent of exports from Japan in 1974 to 14 per cent or more in 1986-89. Japan's
share of world manufactured exports reached a peak in 1986, shortly after the
high point in the exchange value of the dollar, and then declined from 1986 to












Fordefinitions, see previous tables.
Source: United Nations trade tapes
1990. As the country's export share declined, theshare of overseas
manufacturing affiliates in their firms' total exportsgrew from 1986 to 1988
and almost certainly after thatas well. Thus, in Japan, as in the U.S.,
foreign operations seemed to play a defensive role inretaining export- 13-
JapaneseManufacturing








For definitions, see previous tables.
Source: Lipsey (l993b)
markets for firms under adverse conditions for parent exporting.
Sweden underwent large losses in trade shares similar to those of the
United States, although not quite as large. Swedish multinational firms, over
the same period, increased their shares, although the increase was all
concentrated in 1965 to 1970. This increase or stability in the
multinationals' shares was accompanied by, or possibly accomplished by,- 14-
SwedishManufactured Exports and Exports by









Source: United Nations trade tapes andSwedenborg, Johansson-Crahn,
and iCInnwall (1988).
a large shift in the sources of export production, with theportion of exports
sold by foreign affiliates rising froma tenth of the multinationals' total
exports in 1965 to almost a quarter In 1986.
Exports by Foreign Production Affiliates







Source: Swedenborg, Johansson..crahn andKinwall. (1988).- 15-
Thesethree countries are the only ones that collect fairly
comprehensive information on the trade of their multinationals' overseas
affiliates. The data suggest that one major role for overseas production has
been that of retaining market shares when home country economic conditions and
exchange rate changes made the home countries less suitable locations for
export production.
An alternative interpretation of the data1 discussed below, might be
that it was the growth of affiliate production and exports that caused the
reduction in home-country exports. However, home country shares can be
explained to a large extent by home-country price and exchange-rate
movements, not a likely path for influences stemming from decisions to produce
abroad.
Does Foreiwn Production Substitute for Home-Country ExDorts?
Most antagonism against foreign direct investment has historically been
toward inward investment, on the ground that it displaced home-country firms
in home markets. However, there has also been opposition to outward
investment, often led by labor organizations, on the ground that outward
investment "exported jobs," partly by producing products to be imported to the
home-country market but mostly by replacing home-country exports by overseas
production. In the United States, the campaign against outward direct
investment reached a peak with the effort to pass the Eurke-Hartke bill in the
l960s, the Voluntary Program of Capital Restraints from 1965 through 1967, and
then with the compulsory OFDI regulations. These came into effect in 1968 as
an effort to "improve" the U.S. balance of payments, and were specifically
directed against the outflow of capital for foreign direct investment. The
government restrictions were ceilings on the export of funds for foreign- 16-
directinvestment, particularly to Western Europe, but were not aimed at the
expansion of U.S. firms' foreign operations if the expansion was financed from
foreign sources (Fiero, 1969). With the defeat of Burke-Hartice and the demise
of the OFtI in 1974, the campaign has faded, although the Afl-CIO continues to
take a din view of outward investment in its annual statements on economic
policy.
Attempts to measure the effects of overseas production on home-country
exports face the problem of defining substitution and of defining a believable
counterfactual case. Exports from Japan's recently established orrecently
enlarged operations in Southeast Asia may "replace" exports that formerly came
from Japan, but few would claim, after the rise in theexchange value of the
Yen, that they are replacing exports that could now be made fromJapan. A
cross-section analysis does not necessarily escape the problem; itmay be Just
those more labor-intensive industries that couldno longer export from the
home country that establish production abroad.
A tong line of studies has attempted to find evidence ofa relationship
between overseas production and home-countryexports. One of the earliest
U.S. studies, by Gary Hufbauer and F.M. Adler(1968), identified the crucial
importance of the assumptions used to the interpretation ofany relationships
found, and a similar wide range of possible effectswas reported in a major
U.S. Tariff cormsission (1973) study a fewyears later. The Reddaway reports
(1967) and (1968) explicitly assumed that in the absenceof British foreign
affiliates, their markets would have been suppliednot by British exports but
by local or other foreign suppliers.
The preponderance of evidence fromempirical studies points to either no
effect, or a positive effect, of overseasproduction in a host-country market- 17 -
onhome-country exports to that market. Lipsey and Weiss (1981), in a cross-
section analysis examining exports in 14 manufacturing industries by the U.S.
and by 13 other developed countries, to many destinations, found that the
level of production by U.S. -owned affiliates in a country was positively
related to U.S. exports in that industry to that country and, in some markets,
negatively related to exports by other developed countries. On the other
hand, the presence of affiliates frost countries other than the U.S. was
positively related to those countries' exports to that host country and, where
there was any significant relationship, negatively related to U.S. exports to
the country. iii other words, the presence of, and production by. a home
country's affiliates in a host country tended to attract exports from that
home country and to discourage exports to that host country from other
countries. Thus the main substitution that seemed to take place was of
country A's host country production in country C for country B's exports to
country C, and of country B's host-country production in country C for country
A's exports to country C.In these calculations, the variables for U.S. -owned
and foreign-owned affiliate activity were superimposed on a set of standard
gravity equations including host-country income or aggregate imports, distance
from hone to host country, and trade bloc membership. The estimated trade
position in the absence of direct investment is represented by the value of
exports when the home-country affiliate activity variable is set at zero while
the other variables, including foreign country affiliate variables, are at
their actual levels. Since the dependent variables in these equations are
total U.S. and other country exports, rather than the exports by parents, they
take account of any displacements of one firm's exports to a country by the
production in that country by affiliates of another firm from the same home- 18-
country.
Each dollar of overseas affiliate productionby U.S. affiliates in these
cross-section equations added, on' average across thestatistically significant
coefficients, about $.].6 to U.S. exports. Most of the coefficientswere below
$.20. The coefficients for displacements of othercountries' exports were not
so consistently significant and varied widely, but whenevercoefficients for
both U.S. and other countries' exports were
significant, the displacement of
other countries' exports was larger than theaddition to 11.5. exports. That
is a reasonable result since the addition toU.S. exports to a host country is
the net balance of positive andnegative effects of U.S. -owned production
there, while the effect on other countriesexports to that host country are
generally only negative, with no offsetting gains. Oneexceptionto this
negative relation to foreign countries'exports would be the case in which the
U.S. parent has affiliates in the othercountries that are potential suppliers
to the host country. Thus a U.S. -ownedauto assembly plant in, say, the
Netherlands might give rise toexports of auto components from the same
company's German affiliate rather than, or in additionto, exports from the
parent in the U.S.
If a U.S. -owned affiliate in
one country exported to other countries, it
could displace U.S. exports to thosecountries without the offsetting effect
of exports of components and otherinputs to the manufacturing process. That
displacement would be missed in the
equations just described, and Lipsey and
Weiss (1984) therefore examinedthe effects of aggregate affiliateproduction
abroad on the total
exports to all destinations of the cross-section ofparent
firms. The results were thatthe displacement of U.S. exports to third
countries if it existed, was
not large enough to offset the positive effects- 19-
onparent exports to host countries; that is, in each industry, firms that
produced mote abroad also exported more in the aggregate.
It is natural, to think that exports by affiliates to third countries
would necessarily displace parent exports to them, but that is notnecessarily
the case. A plane, truck, or car assembled or even produced completelyby a
U.S. affiliate in country A and exported to country B could later give rise to
the export of parts, accessories, and related products from the U.S. to
country B.
An examination of the same question for a later period (Blomatrom,
Lipsey, andKulchycky,1988). using the direct investment census for 1982
(U.S. Department of Commerce, 1985) produced more ambiguous results. The
later study lacked the information on affiliates of non-U.S. firms that had
been part of the earlier study, but did include a distinction between
affiliate production for export and affiliate production for local sale in the
host country, and also included some equations for production by minority-
owned U.S. affiliates, not available earlier.
When there was any statistically significant relation at all (a minority
of industries), affiliate export sales, or production for export from the
affiliate's host country, were consistently associated with higher U.S.
exports to that host country. That is to be expected, since substitution of
affiliate production for U.S. exports, if there was any, would take place
outside the host country, in the third country, and would be unobserved. For
sales within the host country, most coefficients were positive but there were
more negative (5 out of 30 industries) than positive coefficients among those
that were statistically significant at the S per cent level.
When data for minority-owned affiliates in the host countries, including- 20-
those50 per cent owned, were added to theU.S.export equations, these
affiliate operations were found to be associated with higher levels of U.S.
exports to the host countries. In addition, the inclusion of these
affiliates' operations had a strong effect on the coefficients forproduction
by majority-owned affiliates, moving many from showing negative effectson
U.S. exports to positive effects.
The role of minority-owned affiliates is puzzling and wecan only
speculate on the explanation. One factor is that they arevery unevenly
distributed across countries, being, for example, almost theonly form of
direct investment in Japan and quite important there. We havespeculated that
minority ownership has this strong positive relationship to U.S.exports
because it may be resorted to in countries or industries wherethe U.S. parent
wouldotherwise be barred from a market. Thesemay be markets with more
stringent barriers to imports, or where barriers to imports are associated
with barriers to majority ownership of affiliates.Minority-owned affiliates
may,in such cases, be a price for marketentry more often than in the case of
majority ownership.
Swedenis the only country outside the United States for which
individual firm dataare available that permit an analysis similar to those
carried out for the U.S.A series of Swedish outward directinvestment
surveys was carried out by the Industriens Utredningsinstitut (1131), of
Stockholm, and analyzed in Swedenborg (1973). (1.979),(1982). and (1985), and,
for the 1986 survey, in Swedenborg,Johansson-Grahn, and Rtnnwall (1988).
They examined the effects of overseasproduction by Swedish firms on Swedish
parent exports. Because of the small number ofSwedish parent firms, it was
net possible to run separateequations for individual industries, particularly- 21-
industriesas narrowly defined as in the U.S. studies. However, the Swedish
calculations included many firm characteristics that, in effect, incorporated
industry characteristics, and also separated companies based on Swedish
resource industries.
The Swedish studies included an effort to solve the problem of the
possible simultaneity of direct investment production decisions and home-
country export decisions by a 2SLS approach in which the first stage estimated
the level of production by Swedish affiliates in each host country. The
second stage equation used the estimated production levels from the first
stage, among other variables, in the explanation of parent exports, to each
host country. These equations were applied to each of the survey years and in
a pooled time series-cross section analysis. Swedenborg concluded (1985, p.
235) that OLS estimations, such as those reported above for the U.S.
overstated the positive effects of affiliate production on parent exports.
Her own estimate, from the 2SLS equations, was that each dollar of Swedish
affiliate production added about $.lO to Swedish parent exports, not very far
from the U.S. results mentioned above. From a breakdown of parent exports by
type she concluded that only 2 per cent of the sales provided by foreign
production would be replaced by parent exports if foreign production were
abandoned.
A somewhat different analysis was performed by Elomstrom, Lipsey, and
Kulchycky for 1978, using the same data source as for Swedenborg's studies but
in more aggregated form and with each industry's total manufactured exports
from Sweden, rather than only parent exports, as the dependent variable. All
the coefficients on affiliate sales were positive and, in fact, larger in a
2SLS analysis than in the OLS equations. There was no evidence in the- 22-
comparisonwith Swedenborg's estimates for parent exports, that the positive
effecton Swedish parent exports came at the expense of exports by other
Swedish firms.It seems more likely, although the equations are too different
from Swedenborg's to produce a definitive conclusion, that affiliate
production encouraged not only parent exports to the affiliates' host
countries, but also exports to the same countries by other Swedish firms.
An examination of changes over time, between 1970 and 1978, from the
samesource of data, showed similar results: the greater the increase in
Swedish affiliate production in a country, the greaterthe growth of exports
ofmanufactures from Sweden to that hostcountry. A single exception was
metal manufacturing, where both a high 1970 level of Swedish-controlled
production and high growth in that production in 1970-78 were associated with
reductions in Swedish exports.
A. recent JUl report (Svensson, 1993) challenges the earlierfindings for
Sweden using some of the same data plus the latest, stillunpublished, survey
for 1990. The report concludes that an increase in affiliateproduction for
local host country sale of $1 reduces parentexports by $.14 and that
affiliate production for export to third countries reducesparent exports by
over $.40 for each dollar of such affiliate production.
The apparent contradiction of earlier results is attributedby the
author to his accounting for the effect of affiliateproduction for export on
parent sales to third countries. However, such effects were included in the
analysis of total parent exports by U.S. firms inLipsey and Weiss (1984)
without producing any similar negative effects.The major source of the
difference from earlier results seems to be theformulation of the equations,
which normalizes across firmsby the total worldwide sales of the- 23-
multinationalfirm rather than by parent sales, as in Swedenborg's earlier
studies. The difference is never pointed out and this normalization is
described as a way of eliminating heteroscedasticity. In fact, the result is
that what is being tested is the relationship between the share of worldwide
sales provided by production carried out in a host country and the share of
home-country (parent) exports to that country in the firm's worldwide sales.
It is virtually a certainty that these coefficients for host country
production shares will be negative, but those negative coefficients can be
interpreted as a negative influence on the absolute value of home-country
exports only on an odd implied assumption that is never discussed. The
assumption is that in the absence of foreign production the total size of the
multinational firm's worldwide sales or production would be the sameaswith
foreign production. If Electrolux did not produce in many countries it would
have the same worldwide sales as it has with foreign production. That
assumption would seem to guarantee a negative coefficient for foreign
production on home-country exports, but is not a plausible assumption on which
to rest a study.
On the whole, then, it would seem reasonable to conclude that production
outside the U.S. by U.S. based firms has little effect on exports from the
U.S.by parent firms or by all U.S.fins as a whole, and that to the extent
there is an effect, it is more likely to be positive than negative. This
relationship is probably a characteristic of other countries' multinationals
as well. One reason this is true is that foreign production is undertaken to
expand or retain a parent firm's foreign markets and that parent exports are
incidental to these decisions. As foreign affiliates mature, their imports
from their parents become marginal to their total activity, and fluctuate with- 24-
exchangerace changes and other developments, but there is no indication that
the absolute level of imports from the home country declines over long
periods.
Foreini Production and Home-Country labor
Aside from the relation of overseas production to exports from the
United States, such production could affect the overall demand hr labor
within the United States by parent firms, and the demand for labor of
different types, even if total production in the United Stateswere not
affected, For example, the demand for labor by parent firms might be reduced
if more labor-intensive products were allocated to multinationals'foreign
operations, while more capital-intensive operations were allocated to U.S.
operations. Similarly, the demand for unskilled labor by parents might
decline if parts of the production process or productsrequiring highly
skilled labor were allocated to the U.S. whileprocesses or products requiring
relatively low skills were allocated to overseas affiliates.
The opportunity for multinational firms toengage in such geographical
allocation of their production presumablyrequires that the product be
tradable. If a fin's output must be consumed where it isproduced, as in
many service industries, production will take place where thegoods and
services are sold and will respond tohost-country demand and to host-country
costs. There could still be differencesamong production locations in capital
intensity and skill intensity. These might reflect theelasticity of
substitution between capital and laboror between labor of different skills if
there are significant differences in factorprices, but these should affect
the affiliates' operations ratherthan those of the parents. More important,
there could still be effects of affiliateoperations on parent capital or- 25-
skillintensity if the needs for certain typically central functions, such as
coordination, management, and research and development, were affected by
affiliates' operations.
In this analysis, the level of home country (parent) production is taken
as given and the question is whether, within this fixed level of home
production, the composition of parent production is affected by the parent
fin's foreign production activity in such a way as to alter the parent firm's
demand for labor and for more skilled, as compared with less skilled, labor.
One sign that more labor-intensive activities were being allocated to
foreign affiliates or that production methods were being changed in response
to differences in factor prices would be a lower capital intensity in
affiliate production relative to parent production and a lower capital
intensity in low-income countries than in high-income countries. The data on
net property, plant, and equipment per worker from the latest U.S. outward
investment census indicate that in manufacturing as a whole, the physical
capital intensity of production in developed countries by all affiliates of
manufacturing parents was about 80 per cent of that in parents in the United
States. The capital intensity of manufacturing affiliates in developing
countries was only 42 per cent of that in developed countries.In contrast,
in a broadly defined services group, including all industries except
manufacturing, petroleum, agriculture, mining, and transportation,
communication, and public utilities, the physical capital intensity of
affiliates was higher than that of their parents in the United States. And
for affiliates in developing countries outside of those in manufacturing and
petroleum, physical capital intensity was higher than for affiliates in the
developed countries (U.S. Department of Commerce, 1993, Tables 11.68, 11.813,- 26-
II.G4,ILGI1, ILL.1, and TLP1).Ofcourse, some of the difference in these
aggregate comparisons nay rest on differences in industry composition not
related to responses to factor price differences at all. However, it is hard
to avoid the impression that manufacturing firms adapt affiliate production to
differences in factor prices to a much larger extent than service industry
firms do.
A much more thorough investigation of whether multinational fins
adapted their factor proportions to relative factor prices (Lipsey, Kravis,
and Roldan, 1982) concluded that these fins did use more labor-intensive
methods of production, as measured by property, plant, and equipment per
worker, in low-wage countries. The form that the adaptation took could have
been selecting labor-intensive sub-industries for production in low-wage
countries, or selecting labor-intensive production processes for such
production, selecting small-scale operations for which only labor-intensive
methods of production were available, or by operating in a labor-intensive
way, whatever technologies was selected. These relationships were visible not
only within industries but also within individual firms, and for Swedish as
well as American multinationals.
Judging fron these aggregate data, manufacturing firms were more
responsive to factor price differences in allocating their direct investment
activity than were service industry firms. The reason could be simply a
higher elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in manufacturing
than in services, or it could be that the tradability of manufactured products
makes them more suitable for the allocation of, for example, labor-intensive
activities to labor abundant, cheap-labor countries. In the formercase, of
higher elasticity of substitution in manufacturing, there should not beany- 27-
effectof overseas production on parent labor intensity. In the lattercase,
of allocation of activities in response to factor prices, larger overseas
operations should produce less employment in the U.S. relative to sales (lower
labor intensity of production).
The predominance of evidence for individual manufacturing firms and
their affiliates in six industry groups in the 1982 investment census was that
higher overseas production was associated with lower employment at home, given
the level of parent production (Kravis and Lipsey, 1988). That was the case
for all manufacturing fins as a group and within most of the six major
industry groups. The only exceptions were that sales by majority-owned
affiliates in electrical machinery and by minority-owned affiliates in non-
electrical machinery were positively related te parent employment1 forany
level of parent production.
Some calculations from the latest outward investment census, for 1989,





PNS —Parentnet sales (sales less imports from
affiliates),in $million
ANS —Affiliatenet sales (sales less imports from the
U.S.),in $million
Eachmillion dollars of affiliate production (as proxied by affiliate net
sales), gave rise to a loss of almost one parent employee, given the level of
the parent's production.- 28-
Ifwe separate net sates of affiliates into those of manufacturing and
non-manufacturing affiliates, we find that the negative relationship comes
from the manufacturing production; each million dollars of manufacturing
affiliate production subtracts about 1.4 workers from parent employment while
each million dollars of non-manufacturing affiliate production adds 1.2 parent
employees (equation 2).
(2) PEMP —1.160+6.16PNS -1.38MANS+1.21NMANS —.870




These equations assume that the impact on parent employment is related
to the absolute value of affiliate production: an addition of a million
dollars of affiliate production has the same impact on parent employment
whether the affiliates are one tenth the parent's size, in the aggregate, or
twice the parent's size.
The same calculations can be performed within the major manufacturing
industry groups, reducing the influence of inter-industry differences. Across
industries, any relation between parent labor intensity and foreign operations
is more likely to represent an effect of labor intensity on the tendency to
produce abroad than of foreign production on domestic labor intensity.
The parent employment level equations for major industry groups are
summarized in Table 1, Within the major industry groups, the relationships
are mixed. In transportation equipment, the group with the largest affiliate
sales, the relation is negative; each million dollars of affiliate net sales
is associated with parents having five fewer employees)- In the next largest- 29 -
industryin terms of affiliate sales, machinery, except electrical, each
million dollars of affiliate sales adds one employee to the parent rolls (the
story is similar in the other, much smaller, electrical machinery group). And
in the other major investing industry group, chemicals, there is no relation
to parent employment.
If we separate the affiliates into manufacturing and sales affiliates,
we see that the total affiliate sales coefficients are dominated by those for
manufacturing affiliates, again positive in the two machinery groups and
negative in transportation equipment.
On the whole, these equations for absolute levels of parent employment
are inconclusive, with a mixture of positive and negative relations. We would
not conclude from these results that there is any clear effect of affiliate
production on aggregate parent employment, given the level of parent
production.
A different view of tho effect of overseas production on parent labor
intensity is provided by relating employment per dollar of net parent sales -
ameasure of labor intensity -tothe ratio of overseas (affiliate) to
domestic (parent) production, as in equation 3. Virtually none of the
variation in parent employment per dollar of output is explained by the
(3) £&1— 9.45+1.536 F — .000 PNS
(6.3) (1.1)
PNS
equation. The statisttcally insignificant coefficient suggests a positive
relationship, with a one percentage point increase in the ratio of overseas
production to home production associated with a one and a half percentage
point increase in the ratio of parent employment to sales. Such a positive
relation might occur if affiliate production gave rise to needs for- 30-
supervisory,research, or other types of auxiliary employment in headquarters
operations. The addition of parent net sales as a variable, on the theory
that larger parent firms might be either more efficient or more bureaucratic
than smaller ones, did not reveal any effect of parent size.
A distinction between manufacturing and non-manufacturing affiliates
pointed to the former as having no impact on parent labor intensity and the
latter close to statistical significance at the 5 per cent level, but still a
negligible degree of explanation of the variance in parent employment per
dollar of production (equation 4).
(4) Zth— -.0003PNS +.66MANS+6.48NMANS —.001 PNS
(8.1) (1.0) (.4) (1.8)
Within the six major industry groups, the evidence points to a positive
impact of foreign affiliate production, and particularly foreign manufacturing
affiliate production, on parent employment per dollar of production (Table 2).
The only statistically significant coefficients are in the two machinery
groups, and also for manufacturing production in the food industry. Thus,
from these calculations, we see no evidence of more capital intensive
activities at home from an allocation of labor-intensive activities to
affiliates. More foreign affiliate production, particularly more
manufacturing production, seems to lead to more parent employment in the U.S.
relative to ILS. production. Most likely this is supervisory or other
headquarters employment, but we have no evidence for this conjecture.
Thecorresponding equation for parent employment in all service
industries combined, from the 1982data, showed much larger coefficients than
formanufacturing, negative for majority-owned affiliate sales andpositive- 31 -
forsales of minority-owned affiliates. However, theequations for individual
service industries produced mixed results: half thesignificant coefficients
for majority-owned affiliate sales were positive and halfnegative. For most
industries, no effect was visible, and only one coefficient for
minority-owned
affiliates was statistically significant. Durable-goodswholesale trade and
insurance were the two service industries in whichforeign affiliate sales
were positively related to parent employment per dollar ofparent sales, and
nondurable goods wholesaling and engineering, the twowithnegative
relationships (Kravis and Lipsey, 1988).
One problem with interpreting the data for some serviceindustries,
particularly those in finance, is that the location of production is hardto
define. Part of the sales attributed to a foreign affiliateon the books of
the company for tax or related reasonsmay involve activity actually carried
out in the United States. However, banking and insuranceactivities for host-
country customers, in contrast to that for international customers suchas
U.S. multinationals, arelikely to requireboth host-country employment,
withoutany substitution for domesticU.S. employment, and also some
supervisoryor service employment in the U.S. parent firm. It is thislikely
effect, and the impact on multinational firm profits,that is the motivation
behindthe insistence of the United States on includingservice industry entry
rulesin the Uruguay round of CArlnegotiations,
A rough estimate can be made of the effectof changes in rules for entry
into the insurance industry in various countries.Cross-country regressions
of U.S. insurance affiliate sales (premium values) invarious countries
against income and various country characteristics including theseverity of
restrictions on entry by foreign finns, suggested thata shift by all, host- 32-
countriesto the most liberal regulation regimes would double the sales
(premium values) of life insurance by U.S. -owned affiliates and increase the
sales of nonlife insurance by as much as a third. From the equation for the
relation of insurance parent employment to affiliate sales in icravis and
Lipsey (1988) it can then be estimated that parent employment in the United
States would increase by something in the neighborhood of 10 per tent.
Aside from effects on the parent firms' level of employment, the extent
of foreign operations might also affect the composition of parent employment
in the U.S. and the demand and wages for different skills. To the extent that
parent firms in manufacturing can allocate activities of different skill
levels to different locations to serve worldwide markets, we might expect that
operations intensive in low-skilled labor would be allocated to foreign
affiliates, especially those in countries where low-skilled labor is cheap,
and that high-skill functions would tend to be concentrated in the United
States or, possibly, in other highly developed countries.
Two types of evidence might shed light on this possibility. One is
simply the allocation of activities within U.S. multinationals. Another is
the degree to which a larger share of production carried out abroad is
associated with a higher level of skill in a firm's U.S. labor force.
The data collected on employment include very little on the
characteristics of the parent or affiliate labor forces. One of the few bits
of information is of the proportion of employees engaged in R&D activities,
and another is the average compensation of employees, as a rough indicator of
skill levels.
The data on R&D employment emphasize the concentration of R&D activity
in parent companies:- 33 -
Employmentin R&D as Per Cent of Total EmploymentS 1989
Parentsa Affiljatesb
Manufacturing 5.46 2.42
Petroleum & coal products 374 .66
Wholesale trade 1.82 1.15
Computer & data processing services 8.94 1.05
Communication& public utilities 2.52 1.01
aAll nonbank parents of nonbank affiliates
bjorityo.,ed affiliates, by industry of affiliate
Source: U.S. Department of Commerce (1993), Tables 11.21 and III.C2.
The shareof parent employment inR&D is more than twice that in
affiliatesinalmost every major industry group. It would be more appropriate
to compare parents with their own affiliates, but those data are not
published.Thus, many of the affiliates inwholesale trade are subsidiaries
of manufacturing parents, and including them in the manufacturingsector would
heighten the contrast between parents and affiliates in both manufacturing and
wholesale trade. Judging by the data on R&D expenditures, there isa further
allocation of R&D activities between affiliates in developed anddeveloping
countries, with much higher R&Dintensityin the former group (Lipsey,
Blomstrom. and Kravis, 1990).
An indication of responses to the relative price of skilled ascompared
with unskilled labor was provided by data for a cross-section of Swedish firms
and their affiliates. Although the definition of skilled and unskilled labor
was a crude one (salaried vs. wage workers) and only a small portion of the- 34-
variationin skill composition was explained, there did seem to be a
consistent relationship in which more skill-intensive activities were
allocated to countries where the price of skilled labor was lower relative to
that of unskilled labor.
Within U.S. multinational firms, the average level of compensationper
worker, as a crude indicator of average skill levels, can be related to the
extent of production in majority-owned affiliates (Kravis and Lipsey, 1988).
In manufacturing, the association is weak. The !s are low and are
significant at the 5 per cent level only for total manufacturing and for the
food industry. In both cases, the share of assets overseas explained more of
parent compensation levels than the share of production. The only
coefficients that are statistically significant at the S per cent level are
positive ones for affiliate production shares in the same industries (Appendix
Table 5). If parent output and sales by minority-owned and majority-owned
affiliates in absolute terms are used to explain parent compensation, a little
better explanation is reached, but only parent output and minority affiliate
output are ever statistically significant, and the coefficients are always
positive (Table 1).Thus the general impression is that if there is any
influence of foreign operations it is a tendency toward higher skill levels at
home.
Among service industries, the share of majority-owned affiliates in
production produced significant Ws only for wholesale trade in nondurable
goods, for all services, and for business services (Appendix Table 5).Adding
the other variables produced little improvement in thedegree of explanation,
but the few significant coefficients for affiliateproduction were positive.
On the whole, we can say that in both manufacturing and service- 35-
industriesthe effect of foreign operations on the average skill levelsin
parent companies, if any, was to raise them, but the effect was notstrong and
not universal across industries.
Foreign and Domestic Investment as Comoecitors for Funds
One channel by which a decision by a finn to invest in foreign
production could affect investment in domestic production in the financial
one. The mechanism that would explain such an interdependence or interaction
would presumably imply an upward sloping supply function for the fin's
external finance, so that investments in different locationscompete for
investment funds. It is a channel that would escape the notice ofmost
analyses that take the level of production in each location as given, or as
determined only by demand and costs of production in each location.
Studies of this question by Herring and Willett (1913), and, tosome
extent, by Severn (1972), and Noorzoy (1980), found mostly positive
relationships over time between domestic and foreign investment. Such
relationships, derived mainly from aggregate data, could reflect common
fluctuationsor trends in demand rather than any interdependence.
A studyby Stevens and Lipsey (1992). based on individual firm plant and
equipment expenditure data running for 15 to 20 year periods between the 1950s
and the l970s, attempted to disentangle these effects. Althoughonly seven
fins' data were complete enough to be analyzed, the results werefairly
consistent in suggesting that there was such interdependence. A oneper cent
exogenous rise in foreign demand or in a finn's overseas output was estimated
to reduce the parent firm's U.S. fixed investment by amounts ranging from .3
to .8 per cent in most of the firms.
This is a tentative finding based on a small number of firms in aperiod
of expansion of U.S. firms' foreign production. It would beinteresting to- 36-
testthe same model over the period of contracting or stagnant overseas
production by U.S. firms and also on larger numbers of firms or on industry
aggregates.
In any case, the possibility of this type of competition between foreign
and domestic fixed investment is worth further investigation.
Conclusions -
Manyof the analyses of the effects of outward direct investment
reviewed here implicitly assume that differences among firms and industries in
variouscharacteristics can be at least partly explained by differences in the
degree to which they operate abroad. These same characteristics are also used
to explain the propensity of firms and industries to operate abroad. The
explanation of the existence of direct investment and foreign production is
centered around the idea that firms possess individual firm-specific assets,
such as technologies, or patents, or skills in advertising or marketing, that
can be exploited most profitably by producing in many markets. These assets
are mobile across international borders but not among firms, and firms cannot
realize their value by selling them to other firms or by renting them to other
firms by licensing.
The opportunity to exploit these firm-specific assets via direct
investment adds to the incentive to acquire them. If R&D intensity and human
capital intensity are the strongest explanations of the worldwide trade shares
ofU.S.multinationals (Kravis and Lipsey, 1992), and possibly of their shares
in world production as well, a restriction on direct investment would reduce
the value of investment in such assets and therefore reduce firms' investment
in them.If much of foreign direct investment is defensive, as suggested
earlier, it may make investment in firm-specific assets more profitable by- 37-
extendingthe length of time over which they can be exploited, asuggestion
made many years ago by Vernon (1966).
While firms from different countries tend to possess different firm
comparative advantages, the leading firns in each country tend to
internationalize their production. With the long-term decline in costs of
international travel and communication, the costs of controlling widespread
production must be declining, and firms from most of the countries in the
world are increasing the extent to which they produce outside their hone
countries. With that fact as background, it seems unlikely that the decline
in internationalization of American firms' production willgo much further and
more likely that it will be reversed.
The availability of foreign production locations appears to have
contributed a great deal to the ability of American multinational firms to
retain their market shares in the face of declines in the market share of the
United States as a country, The salle seems to be true for the trade shares of
firms from other countries and this flexibility applies not only tosoftening
the effects of long term national declines in export shares and incomparative
advantage in individual industries, but also those of short-term events such
as large changes in exchange rates.
The frequently expressed fear that American multinationals have been, in
some sense, "exporting jobs" by substituting foreign production for American
production has very little empirical support. For one thing, overseas
employment and fixed investment have been for the most part, declining
relative to domestic employment and fixed investment for ten or fifteenyeers.
And U.S. fines that produce more abroad than others tend also to export more
in general and to the countries where the foreign production takes place. The- 38-
samerelationship is evident for firms based in Sweden, the only other country
collecting similar data on multinational parents and affiliates. Overseas
production has much more to do with contesting market shares than with finding
low-cost production locations, although the latter is also a motivation.
Within multinational firms, the higher the share of overseas operations
in the total production of the multinational, the higher the ratio of home
employment to home production more often than not. A possible explanation is
that a larger share of foreign production requires a larger number of
headquarters employees such as R&D staff and supervisory personnel whose
contribution to outputis not confined to the fin's domestic production. The
relationshipis not unambiguous, since higherabsolute (rather than relative)
productionabroad is more often associated with lower home employment, given
thelevel of home production, a finding we at one time interpreted as implying
an allocation of more capital-intensive parts of total production to the
United States and of more labor-intensive parts to affiliates, especially
those in developing countries. The interpretation that it is technical
activities and management that are allocated to home operations is reinforced
by the fact that higher proportions of foreign activity are associated with
higher average compensation at home.
On the whole, the evidence suggests that the effect of overseas
production on the home-country labor market involves the composition of a
firm's employment at home rather than the total amount of its home employment.
That change in composition is mainly a shift toward more managerial and
technical employment, much like the effects of increasing trade and other
aspects of the evolution of the American economy.- 39 -
Lipsey,Robert E.
Footnotes
I. There may be an inter-industry effect here; the group includes twovery
different industries, motor vehicles and equipment and other transportation
equipment, mainly aircraft. The motor vehicle industry accounts for almost
all the foreign affiliate sales, while the other transportation equipment
industry accounts for note than half the parent employment.- 40-
Lipsey,Robert E.
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Equations for Parent Employment as a Function of Parent and Foreign
Affiliate Production, 1989






Industry Term Net SalesTotalManuf. Manuf. R2
Food & kindred products 4,125 4.87 -.58 .453
(5.7) (.4)
4,125 4.86 -.28 -.18 .443
(5.1) (.8) (.9)
Chemicals 840 4.93 -.20 .864
(18.0) (.6)
1,033. 4.82 -.67 .81 .867
(2.5) (17.5) (1.6) (1.3)
Metals 611 6.04 -.90 .866
(2.5) (26.8) (1.9)
629 5.98 -.40 -1.82 .867
(2.6) (26.1) (.1)(2.1)
Machinery,cxci. 480 6.47 .77 .968
Electrical (2.4) (28.2) (5.8)
475 6.54 .83 .52 .968
(2.4) (26.9) (5.1) (1.6)
Electrical. & 1,642 4.87 3.34 .967
Electronic Equipment (5.1) (30.6) (4.9)
1,618 4.03 -5.33 .970
(5.4) (6.1) (2.6)
transportation Equipment -257 9.10-4.13 .986
(.3) (47.2) (20.2)
-250 9.18 -7.53 7.89 .995
(.4) (77.5) (26.5) (7.1)
Parent employment in No. of employees
Parent and affiliate sales in $million
Numbers in parentheses are t-statisttcsTable 2
Equations for Parent Employment per Dollar of
Production as a Function of Parent Size and Ratio of
Foreign Affiliate to Parent Production 1989
Six Major Industry Groups
Coefficients for
Ratio to Parent Net Sales
NetSales of
Manufac -
All turing Non- Parent
ConstantAffiliateAffi- Manuf- Net
Industry Term Net Saleshates Affil. Sales
Food & kindred prods. 6.50 2.04 .024
(5.6) (1.6)
7.01 2.01 -.165 .018
(5.2) (1.6) (.8)
7.29 2.61 -7.87 -.124 .038
(5.5) (2.0) (1.2) (.6)
Chemicals 5.92 .37 -.002
(17.7) (.9)
6.11 .41 -.153 .006
(17.1) (.9) (1.5)
6.13 .29 .68 -.155 .000
(16.9) (.5) (.6) (1.5)
Metals 8.49 -.059 -.006
(28.4) (.2)
8.96 -.065 -.145 .048
(27.5) (.3) (3.2)
8.98 -.046 -.63 -.739 .043
(27.0) (.2) (.4) (3.2)
Machinery, except 8.22 1.84 .093
Electrical (26.8) (5.2)
8.33 1.97 -.285 .109
(27.1) (5.5) (2.4)
8.48 2.46 -.09 -.241 .135
(27.6) (6.3) (.1) (2.0)
Electrical & 9.11 6.34 .284
Electronic Equipment (13.7) (6.0)
9.32 6.28 -.206 .288
(13.7) (8.0) (1.4)
10.15 8.06 -9.02 -.207 .421
(16.1) (10.5) (3.5) (1.5)
Transportation Equip. 9.74 -1.88 -.001
(16.3) (1.0)
9.71 -.09 -.080 .027
(16.4) (.0) (1.8)
9.81 .637 -12.66 -.061 .032
(16.5) (.3) (1.2) (1.3)Notes to Table 2
Parent empLoyment in No. of employees
Parent sales in billions of dollars
Affiliate sales in millions of dollars
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics